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CAIRO BETWEEN TRACES AND LIBERAL RE-FOUNDATION:
DEMOGRAPHIC STABILIZATION, EXTENSION OF THE 
METROPOLITAN AREA, AND THE RENEWAL OF FORMS
Eric Denis
Introduction
Lacunary perceptions, biased and partial, often anecdotal, and sub-
ject to an impression of  anarchy, disorder and gigantism, commonly 
confer a comfortable illegitimacy on attempts to interpret a metro-
polis like Cairo. The impenetrable crowd, inevitably “clamorous,” 
ensures a cheap continuity for nostalgia about the mysteries of  the 
Orient and about the romanticism of  ruins. Immutable stereotypes 
abound: inhabitants of  roofs, palaces or cemeteries, illegal quarters 
stretching boundlessly on, so many emblematic fi gures supposed to 
give material body to degradation, perdition and an invasion right 
from the countryside; to an explosion, or, better still, an implosion. 
These are convoluted interpretations, which have recently, in a single 
bound, and with a view to building up once more a totally distinc-
tive Arab city, included the notion of  an “Arab street” evidently on 
the verge of  revolt: a kind of  renegotiation of  an idea that is in fact 
outworn, but conveys nonetheless the idea of  the dangerous city.
These stereotypes, cross-bred with Orientalism, lead us on to a 
universal element old as the oldest of  cities, Babylon, that symbol of  
perdition and decadence constantly re-applied to the present of  the 
largest metropolises. The fact that the Egyptian lands were the scene 
of  a succession of  empires, leaving monumental traces universal in 
their scope, notably in Cairo, with the Giza pyramids or the mosques 
and palaces of  the old city, invites us to view the contemporary state 
of  things as one of  decline, to the detriment of  narratives about the 
complexity of  the present and the banality of  daily life. Only splendours 
in ruin remain from the past; the despotism, and the wretchedness of  
the majority, together with the precarious nature of  the majority habitat, 
has left barely a trace.
Our aim here is to show that these stereotypes of  Cairo will not 
bear analysis. The city’s contemporary evolution may be divided into 
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phases corresponding to the global time of  very large metropolises. 
Functional, political, demographic and social transformations reshape 
its ecology, both its forms and the ways of  acting and living in it. They 
also defi ne the city-dwelling community or classify its elements; and, in 
consequence, they write the history and valorize the traces.1
Over some twenty years, Cairo, the fi fteenth largest city in the world 
with its twelve million inhabitants, has experienced a renewal marked 
by demographic stabilization, the affi rmation of  command functions 
and the improvement of  major infrastructures. Cairo has, since inde-
pendence, seen over-investment in the aim of  affi rming itself  as the 
functional capital, modern and productive, of  an independent nation 
state. Hence, a non-stop succession of  public structuring programmes 
has been going on up to the present day, driven by the inertia of  public 
policies claiming to control and orient the overall state of  affairs; and this 
despite the evident harmonization with adjustment and liberalization 
policies favourable to the disengagement of  the public authorities.
At present, Cairo is constantly being patched up and extended by 
private initiatives that are driven, clearly, by a privatization especially 
affecting the urban property fi eld. Hence the surface area of  Cairo has 
doubled in ten years or so, as a result of  prestigious private promo-
tions, while, in its heart, rehabilitation and re-designation of  central 
elements are proceeding apace. Yet the impoverishment of  the major-
ity, still rendered vulnerable by the measures of  structural adjustment 
and economic liberalization, shows no sign of  abating: it continues to 
extend, and make denser, the boundaries of  agglomerations, by the 
normal process of  popular self-building. It is in the context of  such 
tensions and rhythms, both antagonistic and complementary, that these 
urban landscapes emerge, impenetrable and at times so hostile.
An examination of  these mutations—following a consideration of  
demographic stabilization, of  population redistribution, and of  the 
activities and successive spread of  the metropolitan area—will lead us 
to pose a number of  questions about this fabricating of  an image, this 
1 The term trace, used a number of  times in the text, refers to the work of  Bernard 
Lepetit on the historical present: writing, re-writing and mobilizing history in the action 
and the role of  inherited urban objects, whether these are monuments, or popular 
buildings, or indeed those reduced to the cadastral and road framework. See especially, 
“Une herméneutique de la ville est-elle possible?” in Temporalités urbaines, ed. Lepetit 
and Pumain (Paris: Anthropos, 1993).
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re-interpreting of  urban history and re-designation of  places, aimed at 
giving some meaning to the patching up and re-ordering.
National construction and metropolitan explosion
The year 1952 saw the realization of  independence and the end of  
monarchy. It also corresponded to a phase of  modulation in the capital’s 
extreme demographic growth, following a period when it had exclusively 
attracted a large part of  the migratory fl ow from those provinces that 
were the largest exporters of  labour, such as Minufi yya in the central 
Delta, or Suhag in Upper Egypt.2 From that time on, the differential of  
demographic growth would consistently abate in favour of  increasingly 
smaller, and provincial, agglomerations, indicating a structural redistri-
bution of  populations and activities (fi gure 1). Over the century, there 
was a concomitance of  demographic and political infl exions. With the 
regime resulting from the revolution of  the free Offi cers, polarization 
became increasingly qualitative, more economic, political and cultural 
than massively demographic. Attraction became more selective, and 
the movement of  metropolitization was set in motion. Polarization 
and the organization of  fl ows, by and for the capital, accompanied an 
increasingly exclusive draining of  wealth.
If  the tendency was in fact present from 1952, the Cairo agglom-
eration did not, in terms of  absolute value, see an abatement of  its 
growth till the 1990s; it increased by 2 million inhabitants—maxi-
mum—between 1976 and 1986, and by a further million in the fol-
lowing decade. In other words, the last 50 years have been marked by 
an imperative need to equip and ensure the functioning of  a capital 
unable to cope with a demographic pressure initiated by the extreme 
migratory appeal existing at the beginning of  the century. It was the 
diffi culty of  accommodating this surplus population that gave rise to the 
clichés about Cairo’s demographic explosion, and about its inexorable 
degradation, whereas, at that precise moment, plans were being made 
for a less precarious distribution of  inhabitants. However, this project 
was largely hindered by absence of  credit, and by the extent of  war 
efforts, until the 1980s.
2 F. Ireton, “Notes sur les migrations internes en Égypte,” Fascicule de Recherches (Tours, 
URBAMA—CEDEJ—CERMOC) 27 (1988).
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Independent at last, the young nation inherited the inertia inherent 
in earlier, ponderous times, and organization was necessary. Thus were 
imposed the conditions of  a sustained bias towards megalopolis, rein-
forced, for a regime seeking pan-Arab and third world leadership, by 
the need to underline Cairo’s status as a regional capital.3 Consequently, 
the city drew in a large part of  the drive to industrialization, with the 
Hilwan steelworks and cement works, or the military factories in the 
north of  the agglomeration; and it likewise drew in investments geared 
to construction, with the public housing programmes, and programmes 
designed to absorb the services of  a state apparatus reinforcing techno-
structure. Then, in order to maintain and develop this production and 
command potential, enormous construction sites for infrastructure 
became necessary—bridges, auto bridges, sewage system, metro.4
At the end of  the twentieth century, growth rhythms once again 
converged—no longer a sign of  a weak distinction between distant cities 
and the countryside, but rather of  the diffusion of  the urban condition 
to the country as a whole. There was, though, no convergence in the 
modes of  making a city, since, in the meantime, a qualitative ex-fi ltration 
had operated within the city system. A new ecology was being deployed, 
which it will be as well to stop and consider. All the designations of  
agglomeration, and ways of  acting, were transformed. It is pointless 
to look for single boundaries in Cairo, whose region now forms such 
an extended network, so far into the provinces, now spreads, in such 
distended fashion, into the immense expanses of  desert that border 
it. Nevertheless, since all this entity forms a system, the very heart of  
the city fi nds itself  affected by changes of  scale, by redistribution of  
population, by activities, and by values projected on to spaces and so 
redefi ning its territoriality.
3 The notion of  “urban bias” has long been used to stigmatize the negative character 
of  primal urbanization in the so-called countries of  the South, an urbanization that 
captures for itself  most of  the means for a weak production and entails most de-struc-
turing effects. It is nevertheless useful as a way of  designating the pressure on public 
fi nances and the cumulative attractiveness vis-à-vis private investment capacities that 
always result from the imperative affi rmation of  the capitals of  independent states. At 
present, international institutions like the World Bank are predominantly focused on the 
liberal idea of  the metropolis being the motor of  growth or “motor engine” concerned 
with the polarization of  investment effort and the erasure of  regional re-equilibrium 
policies which states no longer, in any case, have the means to implement.
4 É. Denis, “Le Caire, quand la ville déborde son enceinte,” Villes en Parallèle 30–31 
(2000): 89–116.
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Demographic control
The decade from 1986 to 1996 confi rms the structural settling of  growth 
initiated in the metropolitan region in the two preceding decades.5 The 
growth rate of  the region went from 3% between 1976 and 1986 to 1.9 
for the last decade. The annual population contribution fell below the 
rate of  the previous decade: the Greater Cairo region gained 228,000 
inhabitants per year, as against 277,000 between 1976 and 1986.
In comprising 17% of  the total population of  Egypt, the Cairo 
agglomeration, with a constant border, returned to a level of  metropoliti-
zation comparable to that of  the mid-1960s. The period between 1986 
and 1996 confi rms a movement of  diffusion or spread of  the urban 
phenomenon, which had already been sensitive during the previous 
decade. In a context of  generalized settling of  demographic growth, 
those territories having the higher growth rates, above the national aver-
age, were no longer the cities but the small towns, which, for the most 
part, did not fall into the offi cial urban category. The countryside—the 
system of  hamlets, villages and small towns—grew faster than the system 
of  cities. The average annual growth rate of  the offi cial urban element 
was now lower than that of  Egypt. This slowing of  growth was still 
more accentuated in metropolises such as Cairo and Alexandria.
Hence, there emerges a major bifurcation in the distribution system 
of  the Egyptian population. In fact, for almost a century now, the 
growth of  city systems has been consistently stronger than that of  the 
countryside, so conforming to the classic scheme of  polarization and 
urbanization, despite a faster and earlier decrease in fertility in the 
large cities. Cities owed their accelerated growth to migrations from 
the countryside, which, in the most marked phase of  metropolitization 
in the years 1950–1960, was refl ected in a very exclusive capturing of  
Egypt’s human capital on the part of  Cairo. Now, growing numbers 
in the cities were, essentially, no more than the product of  a natural 
growth that was itself  falling off. The large cities, including Cairo, 
no longer owed almost anything to migration; they were even losing 
inhabitants, according to patterns of  de-densifi cation and centrifugal 
5 M. Volait, “Le Caire: Les problèmes de la croissance à la lumière du recense-
ment de 1986,” Espace, Populations, Sociétés 2 (1988): 213–15; F. Shorter, “Cairo’s Leap 
Forward: People, Households and Dwelling Space,” Cairo Papers in Social Sciences 12, 
no. 1 (Cairo, 1989).
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migration towards the peripheries and satellite towns. The general 
confi guration of  regional growth rates was thus, all other things being 
equal, comparable to what it had been at the dawn of  the twentieth 
century (1897–1907). The century thereafter took on the confi guration 
of  a long wave of  metropolitization. This century-long movement was 
then erased in favour of  lower levels of  the hierarchy of  population 
units. Spread replaced polarization; or, more precisely, polarization came 
to focus on the framework of  small towns and villages.
For a hundred years, evaluated at the level of  the markaz and the 
city, the surface area of  the overall inhabited territory affected by 
higher than average annual growth rates fi rst declined, then began to 
spread once more. Now, 68% of  the valley and the Delta had growth 
rates sensibly above the average, while in 1966 that applied to 29% 
only—metropolitization was maximal at that point. In 1897, 58% of  
the viable territory was concerned.
Table 1. Proportion of  the Greater Cairo region to the Egyptian population*
1947: 12.5
1960: 15.7
1966: 17.4
1976: 18.5
1986: 18.2
1996: 17.3
* Constant border 1996, level of  qisms and markazs, or urban and rural districts.
An economic upward movement monopolized less and less by the 
State favours the circulation of  merchandise and goods, reducing the 
importance of  proximity to the metropolis. As we shall see later, how-
ever, the strictly metropolitan economic concentration showed no sign 
of  fl agging; quite the reverse.
Demographic depolarization induces two tendencies: on the one 
hand, the aging of  the centres of  large cities through the residential 
migration of  younger people to ever more distant peripheries; and, 
on the other hand, a breakdown in defi nitive migrations towards the 
large cities. Both phenomena are favoured by the upward movement 
of  circular or pendular migrations; which is, in its turn, the fruit of  
an unprecedented development in transportation capacities and the 
increasing fl exibility of  commuting thanks to the explosion of  micro-
bus lines. All these elements favoured the reduction of  distances, and 
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thus the integration of  the territory. This boom in collective private 
transportation fostered the development of  service and trade functions 
in the lower levels of  the population system. It introduced a cumula-
tive pattern vis-à-vis the fi xing of  populations. Thenceforth, in part, 
merchandise came to the inhabitants. Large cities no longer had a 
monopoly of  trade, as had long been the case within the context of  
a centralized shortage economy. There was a progressive movement 
away from accessibility through mobility of  persons to a proximity to 
merchandise and services.
These changes were closely bound up with the movement away 
from a shortage economy and a generalized scarcity of  products and 
services—with the corollary of  a distribution tightly organized by state 
facilities—and towards an entrepreneurial economy and one of  abun-
dance of  merchandise. Naturally, the profusion of  merchandise did 
not eliminate the real fi nancial problems of  families in accessing this 
merchandise and these services. Improved accessibility makes popula-
tions tend more towards strategies that valorize the ties and the local 
networks of  mutual aid within the family, as opposed to migration 
towards the large cities. It even stimulates a return migration towards 
the “home,” and towards family networks, in order to undertake activity, 
marry, and gain access to housing, even if  work opportunities remain 
closely linked to the relation with the metropolis and, consequently, to 
pendular mobility.
If  we identify “cities” as morphological agglomerations of  more than 
10,000 inhabitants, then we may say that Egypt had 758 of  these in 
1996, compared with 48 in 1897. In 1996, the number of  such cities 
was three times that supplied by the offi cial defi nition. They absorbed 
an urban population making up 70% of  Egyptians, whereas the offi cial 
percentage was 43%. Now, with more than 800 agglomerations, the 
system has reached its limit with regard to the amount of  territory 
practically available and to the proximity of  units separating them: the 
agglomeration of  agglomerations tends to reduce the number of  cities. 
The 120 cities in the Delta comprising more than 20,000 inhabitants 
have, on average, three other cities of  20,000 inhabitants less than 20 
kilometres away, and, in the Valley the 91 cities have on average two 
other cities.
This blurring of  urbanization remains affected by inherited accessibil-
ity corridors. Above all, however, it is, as a consequence of  this same 
reduction in distance and time, meta-polarized and structured by the 
acute proximity of  the Cairo metropolis. Hence more than half  of  the 
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Egyptian population now lives within an 80 to 90 kilometre perimeter 
around Cairo, i.e., at a transportation distance of  120 kilometres maxi-
mum, corresponding to the accepted limit for daily pendular migrations, 
i.e., 3 hours of  overall commuting. A 200-kilometre perimeter takes in 
more than 70% of  the population. This third space also corresponds 
to rural communities with the highest densifi cation: communities with 
more than 3,000 inhabitants per km2 are not rare, while the average 
is 1,700 for the 35,000 km2 of  the viable part of  Egypt, which is actu-
ally higher than for the North American megalopolis. It is, in truth, a 
territory of  interweaving and movement. It should not be conceived 
solely as a suburb dominated by daily commuting between home and 
work: the structuring of  the labour market and the weakness of  salaried 
labour do not favour this. It is a circulatory territory marked by the 
transfer of  merchandise, trade, the search for temporary employment, 
especially on construction sites, and self-employment opportunities 
adapted to circumstances: to localized shortages in labour, to harvest, 
or peak periods in cities and towns—markets, religious holidays, wed-
dings, and so on—without taking into consideration the importance 
of  family visits which constantly re-knit the outlines of  social spaces, 
extending and reinforcing alliances and solidarities.
Since economic metropolitization shows no sign of  fl agging, these 
demographic tendencies, seemingly contradictory, serve the rationaliza-
tion of  the metropolitan machine. They relieve pressure on its centre, 
which can then, more comfortably, become the object of  a functional 
re-appropriation. The useful space as a whole is recomposed in order 
to serve the new metropolitization. This de-concentration movement 
is not, therefore, something commonplace. It has to be understood as 
a hierarchically organized spreading of  an area still extremely polar-
ized. This territory is organized by the centre itself, but with exchanges 
increasingly intense and structured around shifting poles and around 
fl ows that no longer pass by the centre. This third space combines classic 
functions of  alimentary provisioning of  the capital with the capacity 
to produce the urban in situ, by capitalizing competences and human 
resources. A sub-proletariat appears, one which is active, on the one 
hand, to ensure its own survival by making use of  the crumbs from 
the metropolitan machine, and which, on the other hand, provides a 
potential labour force, hence guaranteeing, in the long run, a low labour 
cost and a tight interweaving of  services, vis-à-vis both commercial 
enterprises and private individuals.
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It would be vain to try to delimit the outlines of  this third space. 
It must be understood as a blur structured by poles and corridors. It 
should also be considered that, in a space as tight as viable Egypt, it 
may come to cross-breed within the overall entity. For all that, it will 
always serve a metropolitan machine that constantly capitalizes revenues 
and values added; redistributing only to a minimum degree, in order 
to affi rm or guarantee its centrality.
The centrifugal redistribution of  populations
The continued drop in the growth of  the metropolis is accompanied 
by a unifi cation of  intra-urban tendencies. All the quarters converge 
towards the middle level of  the agglomeration. Growth rates, and 
consequently densities, become homogenous. Initiated in the 1950s, 
the demographic drop of  central quarters, under the conjoined effect 
of  their aging and of  de-concentration migrations towards the periph-
eries, has spread markedly towards the peri-central suburbs—witness 
to the continuous decline of  the residential function at the heart of  
the agglomeration. Despite that, the functional alternative capable of  
appropriating this retreat from the function of  living in the centres 
and peri-central suburbs is emerging only with diffi culty. It is rather 
degradation that still dominates, due to lack of  investment and the 
liberalization of  property and land markets.
The haemorrhaging of  the population has even accelerated in the 
old central quarters. Gamaliyya has only 59,000 inhabitants, whereas, 
at its maximum in 1966, it contained 135,000. Likewise, Muski has 
only 29,000 people and Bulaq 75,000. The October 1992 earthquake 
further accelerated this movement of  de-concentration.
If  the Cairo governorate continues to register a positive growth, weak 
it must be said (1.1% per year), this is only due to its morphological 
expansion to the east and northeast, on the desert plateaus. The popular 
quarter of  al-Salam, with an annual growth rate of  14%, now has some 
370,000 inhabitants compared with 100,000 ten years before. Likewise, 
Madinat Nasr, a planned residential suburb initiated at the beginning 
of  the 1970s, exhibits a sustained rhythm—more than 9% per year for 
20 years now. At present, it has 400,000 inhabitants.
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Redistribution prior to migration from the provinces
It is a fact of  major signifi cance that the capital no longer attracts 
migrants from the provinces. In 1960, 35% of  the inhabitants of  Cairo 
had not been born there. Such people comprised barely more than 
12% in 1996 (fi gure 4). For their part, the peripheral governorates of  
Giza and Qalyubiyya saw a sensible increase in the number of  non-
natives, but more than half  of  these were migrants coming from Cairo. 
Nevertheless, Cairo, with its central and peri-central stock of  old and 
dilapidated housings available at the most modest rent, remains the 
preferred destination for half  the migrants from the provinces. They 
then subsequently redistribute themselves, at the level of  the agglom-
eration, by taking part in the overall centrifugal tendency. In the north 
of  Cairo, Qalyubiyya has begun to play an essential role with regard 
to the placing of  provincial migrants. As in the case of  Giza, this phe-
nomenon should be perceived as a refl ection of  metropolitan spread. In 
the oldest and most central zones (degraded or village habitat nuclei), 
migrants replace a local population that has moved on to property and 
to better housing conditions on the periphery.
The deferment of  growth—i.e., the de-cohabitation migrations of  
younger people and the aging, in situ, of  the inhabitants of  the centre—
fi nds expression in the depopulation of  an intra-urban area becoming 
ever wider, and with this being in the Giza and Qalyubiyya provinces 
reinforced by the collapse of  migrations from the provinces. During the 
last inter-census period between 1986 and 1996, those districts in decline 
lost 500,000 inhabitants in all. This entity, which includes, at one and 
the same time, the old centre, the business centre and the degraded 
suburbs, lost more than 14% of  its inhabitants in 10 years.
Over the same period, the remainder of  the agglomeration, by a 
cumulation of  input through overspill and through a strong natural 
growth linked to the taking in of  a young population stemming from de-
cohabitation following marriage, has grown by more than 40%. Above all, 
with an additional growth of  30% in ten years, growth is affi rmed more 
clearly than before in small towns and villages, not yet agglomerated.
Non-regulated habitat of  popular origin, or the future of  Cairo
The de-concentration and de-cohabitation migrations of  young house-
holds are thus an essential vector nourishing the redistribution of  the 
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population. They are refl ected in the aging of  the centre and in a cumu-
lative rejuvenation of  peripheral quarters that receive young couples 
and their children. Hence, in an unplanned, really fl ourishing quarter 
such as al-{Umraniyya, 21% of  the population is below the age of  10, 
while 3.5% is above the age of  60. The estimated migratory balance of  
this district indicates a positive balance of  140,000 people over 10 years 
(1986–1996). Comparable structures are found in quarters like Bulaq 
al-Dakrur, Matariyya, Hilwan, Shubra al-Khayma, or Hawamdiyya.
Conversely, in a central quarter like Qasr al-Nil, those below the 
age of  10 years make up hardly more than 7% of  inhabitants, while 
12% are above the age of  60. Maadi, Zamalek, and also Dokki, are 
likewise aging. Despite negative migratory balances, the older central 
qisms, such as Gamaliyya, have preserved a population where children 
are still numerous (15%), while persons over 60 make up less than 5%, 
this refl ecting the resistance of  their popular bases.
Despite this persistent centre-periphery differentiation, there is a 
tendency to uniformization of  demographic profi les. The proportion of  
those under the age of  15 is stabilized around 32% of  the population, 
i.e., 4 million individuals. This result, which testifi es to a decrease in 
the birth rate in the popular peripheral quarters too, is very favourable 
to the qualitative amelioration of  the apparatus of  schooling—at least 
with regard to its improvement and equipping in quarters that have, 
up till now, been neglected on account of  illegal building. On the other 
hand, the weight of  people between the ages of  15 and 60, i.e., of  
the potentially active population, has increased very markedly. They 
are now 8 millions, as against 6 millions some ten years before. This 
increase, the fruit of  births between 1970 and 1980, imposes consider-
able pressure on the labour market. It is neither a factor of  evolution 
towards full employment, nor of  a reduction in precariousness or of  
an increase in wages. It is rather a basic element for a security-based 
approach to urbanization, one that ceaselessly sets its imprint on the 
agglomeration, inviting those who can to join the private cities (gated 
communities) set well apart in the deserts and behind high walls.
Densities redistributed but showing little reduction
The movement towards unplanned quarters is showing a tendency to 
weaken: these quarters are registering a sensible decrease in their annual 
growth rate. On average, the rate now amounts to 2.7%, compared with 
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5.9% during the previous decade (1976–1986). Their rate of  increase 
is now lower than that of  the peri-urban markazs, which is of  3.2%, 
refl ecting a spread of  the migratory fi elds of  de-concentration.
The convergence of  densities around the average for the agglomera-
tion is a direct consequence of  this demographic mechanism, social 
and relative to land, of  de-concentration from the centre towards the 
peripheries. However, Cairo does not follow the model of  centrifugal 
redistribution according to the most current canons. As a whole, the 
agglomeration remains extremely dense. With 217 inhabitants per 
hectare, it remains one of  the densest among the large metropolises in 
the world, along with Bombay, Jakarta and a number of  great Asian 
cities. It is in no way comparable to the capitals of  Latin America 
and Africa. The average density of  Mexico does not in fact exceed 30 
inhabitants per hectare, or that of  Sao Paulo 20.6
If  the centre has been continuously depopulated for more than 20 
years, the new popular peripheral quarters have shown minimal spread, 
by reason of  the scarcity and hence the high cost of  land. Consequently, 
popular expansion, i.e., the building which, in the absence of  major 
investors, overfl ows schemes of  physical planning and compromises 
regulation, produces an extremely dense urban space. The strength of  
this movement of  popular promotion has led it to become the norm, 
and it now accommodates 60% of  the Cairo population. These new 
territories reach densities comparable to that of  the old city. Imbaba, 
a quarter that has reached saturation point, as is shown by its growth 
rate now below 1% compared with more than 9% in the 1960s–1970s, 
reveals itself  to be the densest qism of  the agglomeration with 800 
inhabitants per hectare.
The modes of  producing and inhabiting the fringes of  the metropo-
lis do not, then, conform to the classic model of  peri-urban spread; 
this phenomenon remains marginal. Popular promotion has more to 
do with the confi guration of  old faubourgs than with un-coordinated 
 outgrowths that invaded the available space in extensive fashion—as 
may be observed in the wide expanses, often public and undeveloped, 
that surround African or Latin American metropolises. Here, most of  
the popular habitat is developed on private land that has been the sub-
6 F. Moriconi, Geopolis: Pour comparer les villes du monde (Paris: Anthropos, coll. Villes, 
1994).
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ject of  a transaction; it is the building that is illegal. Given the extreme 
scarcity of  accessible land, verticalization is maximal and the space left 
for roadway network and services minimal, all the more so in that no 
authority is present. There is no pre-emption from the point of  view of  
installing collective equipment, or of  the imposition of  ground occupa-
tion coeffi cients—since building is legally prohibited. As for the layout 
and parcelling, these are determined by prior agricultural organization 
and the hierarchy of  the irrigation system.
In these very dense faubourgs, which are in direct contact with the 
agglomeration, any notion of  being thrust outside or set at a distance 
is reduced due to the nearness of  the legal city and the centres: in 
Cairo, informal quarters such as Bulaq al-Dakrur or Imbaba are in 
fact less than 3 kilometres away from the functional centre. Moreover, 
the supplying of  these districts, in terms of  transportation, water, 
power, sanitary drainage, and so on, costs incomparably less than for 
an authorized appropriation, lacking elevation, within the construction 
framework. These city-dwellers, the great majority natives of  Cairo, 
produce a very structured urban organization, where proximity and 
compactness are resisting.
A spread is indeed in evidence, as may be seen from the high 
growth rate in development corridors on the desert plateaus; but, so 
far, popular construction has resisted this movement far away from 
the centre. Cramming together remains, massively, the rule. Nearby, 
equipped and opened up, the accessibility of  these quarters makes 
them sought-after places, where a new generation of  buildings, better 
fi nished and higher, is appearing. There is no more pushing out at the 
edges, except in cases of  extreme saturation and property revaloriza-
tion by integration within the legal property market and land tenure 
securing. The most modest households, thus excluded by the increase 
in prices and rent, go to live further off. Between 1991 and 1998, the 
unregulated habitat spread by 25 square kilometres on the edges, i.e., 
a growth rate of  3.2% per year.7
7 É. Denis and E. Séjourné, “Le Caire: Métropole privatisée,” Urbanisme 328 (2003): 
31–37.
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A redefi nition of  available property
These redistributions are articulated according to the dynamic of  prop-
erty. The demographic decline of  the centre was followed by a reduction 
in the amount of  precarious housing (tents and habitats in canvas and 
wood), and in shanty towns. The majority of  this precarious housing is 
concentrated in the old city and the ancient faubourgs such as Bulaq, 
on roofs, and in courtyards and cul-de-sacs. These cases excepted, such 
classic features of  imploding Cairo are, as the urban landscapes testify, 
given over to peripheral habitat, i.e., apartments in blocks of  three or 
four storeys. In the Cairo governorate in 1996, the precarious habitat 
made from collected material represented 2.5% of  the housing stock, 
compared with 5% in 1986. Even so, this represents 11,000 housing 
units, i.e., around 50,000 people! Also, the number of  single-room 
houses or shared houses in Cairo fell from 15 to 9% of  the stock. In 
other words, this available housing stabilized at around 264,000 units, 
plus 70,000 in Giza and 34,000 in Qalyubiyya. Hence, some 1.5 million 
persons, or 13% of  the agglomeration’s inhabitants, still live in relatively 
precarious housing conditions, since they are unable to live within the 
legal habitat and even in the popular promotion quarters.
This inadequacy of  available housing vis-à-vis demand increased 
once more between 1986 and 1996: the housing stock increased by 
300,000 occupied new units and 248,000 empty ones. As in the rest 
of  urban Egypt, the volume of  new empty housing in Cairo is greater 
than the stock ten years earlier. Cairo now has 486,000 empty housing 
units compared with 238,000 in 1986, i.e., 17% of  available property 
as against 14%. Giza has 265,000, i.e., 22% of  its available housing, 
and Qalyubiyya 98,000, or 20% of  its stock—i.e., a total of  850,000 
houses fi nished and inhabited. The phenomenon is not, however, a 
recent one: as early as 1882, 20% of  Cairo housing was uninhabited.
This property available but immobilized, outside the market, includes 
20 to 30% of  old, degraded habitat which provides no immediate 
alternative to housing in informal quarters. These latter are mostly 
located in saturated central or peri-central quarters. Furthermore, 
while progressive deregulation of  rent may affect the market for new 
housing, it is not capable of  offering massive reinvestment for the 
central property capital where rents are pegged. The increase in the 
number of  unoccupied houses refl ects, in particular, the power of  
the peripheral property promotion dynamic. Hence, 9% of  the 1.5 
million new housing units produced in the last ten years, in the met-
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ropolitan region, are to be found in Madinat Nasr. This quarter has 
135,000 more units than resident families, meaning it has the potential 
for a doubling of  its population without any new building! Nor are the 
non-regulated quarters exempt, since they contain 50% of  the unoccu-
pied units. Here, too, the available stock would permit a quasi-doubling 
of  the population without any new buildings. Illegality is therefore no 
bar to speculative investment, since building is guaranteed by virtue of  
its insertion within the existing agglomeration.
The new ecology of  integration by the market
The city of  popular origin, whose buildings are not recognized by 
positive law but are secure in practice, tends to install itself  as a com-
monplace feature and a standard norm for living. At present, debate 
focuses rather on the best way to legalize it than on procedures geared 
to keeping it on the margin and containing its inevitably overfl owing 
energy. The motive behind this change in perspective is not a chari-
table one; rather, there is affi rmation of  a new metropolitan ecology 
leading to a new designation of  the totality and its parts. The aim is 
to integrate in order to control; to recognize in order to create within 
the city, en masse, new taxpayers who are part of  society; and, fi nally, 
to make transparent a powerful investment dynamic which will capture 
an important share of  metropolitan wealth.8
The reversal happened at the turn of  the 1980s–1990s, taking place 
alongside the decrease in residential migration towards Cairo and 
the urbanization of  the provinces. Up to that time, the city, and the 
modes of  intervention or protection regarding it, had been conceived 
with a view to defending an entity: Cairo and its citizens. Successive 
blueprints aimed to prevent it from overfl owing and to consolidate the 
existing function of  parts.9 Policies meant protection of  a city, which 
perceived itself  as denatured by the parasitic and denaturing invasion 
of  provincials; an invasion that was the cause of  all the city’s ills. These 
8 The illegal property stock, estimated at 175 billion dollars by the team of  H. De 
Soto (1997), represents a capital apparently outside the market, which is equivalent to 
22 times the fi nancial capital invested in the Cairo stock market, or 40 times the total 
of  foreign direct investment in Egypt up to 1996. 
9 G. El Kadi, “Trente ans de planifi cation urbaine au Caire,” Revue Tiers-Monde 31, 
no. 121 (1990): 166–185; Denis, “Le Caire, quand la ville déborde son enceinte.”
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provincials, regarded naturally as peasants, were the Other, the stranger, 
the scapegoat. Hence, the city acquired a surrounding protection that 
was also a peripheral boulevard, supposed to mark the limits of  the 
legitimate city. All that was not within its walls did not exist, and, in 
consequence, could not be the subject of  any equipment with facilities. 
Thus, the new cities were conceived as the sole legitimate alternative, 
to oppose the fl ourishing of  the non-regulated habitat. Nevertheless, 
whatever policies were devised to contain illegal building, or to trans-
fer the popular dynamic out towards new cities, these policies failed; 
they were diverted from their initial objective. The new cities were 
populated very slowly. This failure was bound up with the need for 
tolerance so as to maintain social peace and client networks, or with 
the speculative nature of  the building, or even, gradually and over time, 
with the imperative effort to reduce the public debt. The construction 
of  public housing is an abyss, geared, above all, to ensure the vitality 
of  the construction material side—steel and cement—and the building 
side itself: those fundamental industrial bases promoted to affi rm the 
young nation, independent since the 1960s. Quite simply, and especially 
after the signing, in 1991, of  agreements with the IMF entailing the 
adjustment of  public expenditure and privatization, ways of  viewing 
and acting had to move on. It was no longer possible to propose an 
alternative to housing of  popular origin through socially vocational 
public construction. If  people were able to house themselves, it was 
best to go along with this, and their investment should be recognized. 
Following this logic to its liberal conclusion, some went so far as to sug-
gest to the Egyptian Ministry of  Finance that this “dead capital,”10 once 
recognized, would become a mortgage potential, and, consequently, a 
huge source of  productive capital to make the metropolis more dynamic 
and integrate populations. The industrial side of  the building trade gave 
lively support to this approach favouring the legalization of  building and 
the transformation of  land, since it was being increasingly deprived of  
public revenues designed for housing. Non-regulated habitat, it stated 
bluntly, was its main market; hence, to oppose popular building would 
in effect be to oppose industrial expansion.
Thus, popular habitat was becoming something quite normal, even 
if  legitimization was unsystematic, even if  it was accompanied by 
10 The term used by De Soto, in The Mystery of  Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in 
the West and Fails Everywhere Else? (Basic Books, 2000).
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inherited forms of  resistance, on the part of  administrations, towards 
the assimilation of  populations involving ordinary citizens. In fact, 
this strictly legal and liberal approach, which confi ned the role of  the 
State to that of  warrantor of  private property, was eventually revealed 
as utterly simplistic. It generated a new cadastral administration that 
was inevitably cumbersome to set in place and manage. The study 
ordered by the Ministry of  Finance indicated that 92% of  property 
was to be legalized, along with 88% of  the activity!11 The modalities of  
this legalization of  the majority of  habitat were evidently essential for 
the future of  urban forms and for Cairo society. Reinforced by foreign 
experiments, the approaches adopted became increasingly hybrid and 
critical of  strictly macro-economic objectives.12 They took into account 
the complexity and nuances of  illegality along with traditional norms 
of  property recognition: in other words of  the hybrid legal usages and 
the coherence of  local fabrics of  popular origin. The strictly liberal 
approach totally ignored the weight of  rental within the non-regulated 
habitat. Nevertheless, it housed more than 40% of  modest families 
who were defenceless in the face of  the inevitable revalorization of  
quarters and of  the leases to which legalization led. The same was to 
apply to the large number of  landlords who were now tempted to re-
sell their land and to re-invest further off, on lands where building was 
still forbidden. In this way the distribution of  property titles became 
the principal motor for the extension of  illegal habitat in cities like 
Istanbul and Mexico. Approaches involving recognition and equipment 
for infrastructure and services thus came to be increasingly preferred 
by competent authorities and international programmes.
Following the same purely economic and accounting perspective for 
the making of  a metropolis, and in order to satisfy the industrial branch 
of  building and also swell its coffers, the State, brutally and radically, 
opened up the desert expanses, on both sides of  the new cities, for 
building. It placed these reserves of  land at the disposal of  property 
companies who developed on them a unique product: private cities and 
gated communities. Hence, no less than 100 square kilometres, a surface 
area equivalent to more than a third of  the city that had taken over a 
11 De Soto, The Mystery of  Capital.
12 A. Gilbert, “On the mystery of  capital and the myths of  Hernando de Soto: what 
difference does legal title make?” International Development Planning Review 24 (2002): 1–20; 
D. Sims, “The Cairo Case,” in Understanding Slums: Case Studies for the Global Report on 
Human Settlements 2003 (London: UN-Habitat and DPU, 2003).
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thousand years to fi nd its present structure, was set to building work, 
and became partially inhabited in scarcely more than ten years!
The new exclusive ecology of  megalopolitan fears
Private cities, with such evocative names as Utopia, Dream Land, Bev-
erly Hills, Palm Hills, or Qattamiya Height, answered to the imperative 
restructuring of  the building trade, which had lost the public housing 
market. To sell this kind of  living, so totally alien to local usages in 
its differentiation and distinction with regard to density, at the level of  
the building as such, required a considerable effort in redefi ning urban 
fears and dangers.
Discourse about the city which had, urgently, to be protected from 
invasion by peasants, and about defence of  the city’s integrity, was radi-
cally swept aside in favour of  a totally negative vision of  the degradation 
of  the city as a whole—there was nothing left to defend. A series of  
events formed the narrative fabric of  what gradually imposed itself  as 
an imperative need to leave the city and move to well-guarded private 
cities, in one’s own community and well outside, far from crowds and 
pollution. The earthquake of  October 1992 shed light on gigantic 
popular quarters, which rescue teams were unable to enter after having 
excluded and ignored them for so long. They had no landmarks or stag-
ing points. By contrast, associative networks with Islamic reference, well 
established in the health sector and in schooling, swiftly answered the 
call. Non-regulated habitat was no longer this terra incognita, or, worse, 
home to a potentially violent confrontational group that needed to be 
re-conquered. There followed legal recognition and equipping. At fi rst, 
though, confrontation with the police was the dominant feature, and the 
illegal quarters came to be stigmatized as turfs of  violent confrontation 
with the authorities. This sometimes led to massive police intervention, 
notably in the popular quarter of  Imbaba at the end of  1992. This 
quarter was then designated an independent Islamic republic. The 
notion of  “illegal quarter” came just at the right time for a distraught 
government facing ever more violent opposition: it permitted the precise 
localization of  a peril, diffused within society, at the gates of  the city, 
and the actualization of  a scapegoat fi gure. It was no longer a matter of  
peasants infesting the city, but rather of  a potentially dangerous youth 
adhering, in massive numbers, to radical Islamism. Ecology was thus 
set harmoniously alongside local socio-demographic reality and global 
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time—Cairo and Islamist youth. In conjunction with all this was a sharp 
increase in ecological speeches about the city’s pollution. These were 
based on spectacular real-life accidents conducive to urban anguish, like 
the pungent fumes that invaded the agglomeration in autumn, more 
and more each year, when the cotton stalks were burned. This burn-
ing coincided with the inversion of  temperature whereby the ground 
became hotter at night in the agglomeration, and so, in the absence 
of  any wind, caught all the fumes.
All these alarming facts, once worked on by the media, led to an 
irreversible resolve, on the part of  those who could afford it, to take 
up the notion of  the city in the countryside and the quest for paradise 
on earth, the notion of  being in one’s own group, with a pool and 
the Garden of  Eden, a package praised and sold by the promoters of  
the private cities, along with all the other attributes of  the Eden-style 
consumption society, like golf  and amusement park or commercial 
mall. The city was lost. It was pointless to go on defending it. We 
had to escape from it. In this way, talk of  security, and the market 
for security, could blossom. There was no way, in any case, to go on 
protecting one’s integrity, or to go on seeking some alternative to the 
art of  making one’s own home, apart from ordinary inhabitants. This 
was interpreted by the new residents of  private cities as: “it’s time to 
experience our city on the level of  the greatest metropolises, without 
waiting for some hypothetical development and improvement of  the 
totality.” This break-off  from the greater number, the non-promotion 
of  this number, with the increasing duality of  metropolitan forms that 
it implied, was even necessary. It was imperative both for the reproduc-
tion of  the model of  deeply unequal division and to stay on top of  
the costs of  industrial production on the globalized market of  capital 
and merchandise, and even for the fl ourishing of  a service society that 
likewise required abundant and cheap labour. Within the irresistible 
context of  deregulation, informality was a fl exible capital whose upward 
movement was not confi ned to the so-called developed countries. The 
dynamic of  a metropolis like New York owed much to the utilizing 
of  an under-proletariat imported or fallen in status. As in Cairo, the 
whole was a system contributing to the convergence of  landscapes.13 
Illegal habitat should not, therefore, be confused with uncontrolled 
13 See J. Abu Lughod, “Le Caire et New York vus de la rue,” Revue Internationale des 
Sciences Sociales 42 (1990): 345–358.
JAYYUSI_f46_1085-1114.indd   1103 4/22/2008   8:05:42 PM
1104 eric denis
development; it was rather an urban form dependent on modes of  an 
economic and political insertion that needed to be reinforced.
The return of  the private and the semi-public
The totality of  the private city does not simply refl ect the return of  
private promotion as an essential motor for the animation of  urban 
forms and the re-composition of  the metropolis; it also entails a major 
reform of  city government. If  it was possible, in 1992, to designate the 
ordinary quarter of  Imbaba as secessionist, given its non-recognition 
by State services and the opportunist interventions of  organizations 
with an Islamic reference, the private citizenship set in place, de facto, 
by the tight municipalism of  private cities represented an open denial 
of  the State’s omnipotence. In fact, buyers were seeking to escape a 
lost city, endlessly corrupt, and, consequently, the negligence of  an 
administration incapable of  providing and maintaining basic services. 
If  the State, through programmes of  new cities, had provided the basic 
infrastructure allowing private cities to fl ourish, and had sold the land 
they were built on at a low price, all present development was to its 
disadvantage. The city-dwelling ideal was to be found elsewhere. This is 
obvious, for example, in the choice, on the part of  a number of  private 
cities, to seek to exploit the potential profi ts from the common funds 
placed in the Cairo stock market. This emerging “private” citizenship 
was all the more powerfully signifi cant in that it imposed itself  at a 
time when authoritarianism was being reinforced. Privatization was to 
be seen in the explosion of  shopping malls, those semi-public places 
where entrances and exits were controlled.14
There was also an experiment with privatization to try and solve 
the problem of  illegal quarters, with the intention—diffi cult to trans-
late into practice—of  conceding to contractors pieces of  land in the 
heart of  under-equipped quarters, on condition they reserve a part 
of  their concession for collective services and social housing. With the 
abandonment of  overall strategic planning, this incitement approach, 
devised in the light of  the State’s measureless need of  funds, led to 
a total retreat on the part of  regulatory authority. Production within 
14 M. Abaza, “Shopping Malls, Consumer Culture and the Reshaping of  Public 
Space in Egypt,” Theory, Culture and Society 18, no. 5 (2001): 97–122.
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the city had become no more than the sum of  uncoordinated private 
initiatives or, at best, something geared to the interests of  investors. 
Thus was sketched out a way of  making the city close to what it had 
been before independence, i.e., a city parcelled by private concession, 
or, still earlier, by princely or religious foundation.15 As such, those 
critical of  the city’s present diffi culties increasingly targeted the public 
policies that had followed independence, and they stigmatized the 
material urban results of  these policies: industrializing industries that 
had become a major source of  pollution, social habitat more unhealthy 
than the unregulated kind, pegging of  rents, destruction of  the prop-
erty patrimony, or else an overloaded administration clogging up the 
city centre. So many assertions, widely remarked on, which adversely 
affected the legitimacy of  a State already unable to raise taxes and, in 
consequence, able only to tolerate, not even to regulate. The absence 
of  a land and property tax system did, though, have the advantage that 
it need not recognize inhabitants’ rights; as such, it could maintain a 
client relation, authoritarian and arbitrary, with city-dwellers confi ned 
to an infra-legal margin.
This forced lack, on the part of  the public authority, of  initiatives 
aimed at organizing the metropolis revealed that it never had in fact 
any real authority, and that the period between independence and the 
present day had been an imported modernist parenthesis, having only 
a marginal effect on the city. In particular, the creation of  public spaces 
open to the public as a whole under the aegis of  the public authori-
ties—a seemingly universal foundation of  the modern city—had never 
adequately fulfi lled the aspirations of  the majority; there were operas, 
prestigious gardens, and so on. When these places did in fact approach 
fulfi lment of  such aspirations—squares, gardens, or youth centres—the 
competent services were barely able to maintain them. It was as if  the 
notion of  “public” had failed to fi nd a legitimate place in a metropolis 
whose usages inherited from the practices of  Muslim law valorized and 
guaranteed private property, while at the same time promoting the idea 
that residents were responsible for maintaining shared spaces. From 
this perspective, the way monopolization by the public authority was 
followed by a rapid degradation of  the forms of  Muslim appropriation 
and collective management, like waqf  and habus, speaks eloquently. The 
15 See J. L. Arnaud, Le Caire, mise en place d’une ville moderne (1867–1907) (Sindbad-
Actes Sud, 1998); A. Raymond, Le Caire (Fayard, 1993).
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incapacity of  the public authority to assume its obligations, its resigna-
tion in the face of  degradation, explains in its turn the absence of  any 
sense of  responsibility in the users of  streets to maintain them, their 
tendency to litter these streets without a second thought; all the more 
so in that this was one of  the few forms of  opposition tolerated.
By contrast, the maintenance and laying out of  pavements, which 
was the responsibility of  residents outside the great axes, offered these 
residents the chance to create open, mediating spatial devices and to 
affi rm collective competences. So that there could be a space provided 
for the public, the proprietor, or indeed the local community, had to 
provide passers-by, and the neighbourhood, with something clearly 
worthwhile—fountains, mosques, schools, cafés, gardens, and com-
merce.16 So it was that, in the cities of  popular origin, public space was 
made up from co-presence and the exposition of  oneself. Even if  there 
was a mistrust—not always clearly expressed but unmistakable—towards 
the pretension of  the modern State to manage and divide up the patri-
mony excluded from the market, it must nevertheless be recognized that, 
in a city like Cairo, the State owned more than half  the land and the 
constructed patrimony, plus the totality of  its outlying desert districts. 
As such, the Cairo landscapes were powerfully marked by the crushing 
weight of  building and land outside the market, the great majority of  
it not shown to advantage, rather highly degraded. For some ten years 
now, the State had disengaged itself, had put up for sale this land and 
property patrimony in the old centres—buildings belonging to insurance 
companies especially, but also the property of  the waqfs. The search 
for funds and the confi rmed, unreserved adherence to liberal dogma 
lay behind such sales. But this was not the sole reason: they were also 
a way of  disengaging the State from responsibilities that State services 
could not assume. It was, in fact, a recognition of  a structural incom-
petence. At the same time, this considered sale of  the public patrimony 
remained the last orientation instrument of  urban development for the 
State services;17 plus the fact that it constituted a powerful instrument 
of  revenue redistribution for contractors close to the regime.
The principle of  a modernist and interventionist parenthesis, within 
the long period during which a city like Cairo had been structured, 
16 J. Akbar, Crisis in the Built Environment: The Case of  the Muslim City (Singapore: 
Minar, 1988).
17 M. M. El Araby, “The role of  the state in managing urban land supply and prices 
in Egypt,” Habitat International 27 (2003): 429–458.
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is confi rmed by the absence of  urban forms that might be the fruit 
of  a middle class receiving deliberate support through access to prop-
erty credit. These forms, so characteristic of  residential access in the 
twentieth century, from the block to the villa, which came to be in the 
majority while the metropolises of  industrial democracies were being 
extended, are not to be found in Cairo. The standard habitat based 
on institutional credit is non-existent, apart from projects by certain 
investors, all of  them liable to speculative miscalculation. In fact, the 
middle class, in the sense of  a population with stable jobs and suffi cient 
remuneration, does not exist. The meagre and precarious nature of  
income forestalls it. In other words, even the habitat of  popular origin 
is the product of  precious fi nancial accumulation, from a migration to 
the oil monarchies of  the Gulf, for instance. Moreover, this immedi-
ate fi nancing of  building imposes specifi c modes of  living and urban 
forms, marked by a maximization of  land revenue, and thus of  densi-
ties. It requires that construction costs be reduced to a minimum, while 
radically restraining the fi nancing of  all other budgetary areas, thereby 
reducing the chances of  a rise in consumption.
At the other end of  the social spectrum, the requirement to pay in 
cash encourages ostentatious buildings that magnify, in their adornment, 
the fi nancial power of  the owner. The ostentatious may be all the better 
expressed given the building of  new prestige residential centralities in the 
desert; the sense of  propriety needed in cohabitation in the metropolis, 
in proximity to others, is no longer felt necessary. The ways of  living 
in, of  experiencing the metropolis have become exclusive.
Nostalgia and patrimonialization as a means of  publicizing liberalization
The sale of  public patrimony in the old centre has been accompa-
nied by the valorization of  blocks and other old buildings that are 
noteworthy from an architectural or simply historical point of  view, 
as markers of  identity or structuring points of  reference. This having 
been said, the opening up of  the property market has been based on 
the valorization of  the vacuum, i.e., of  the central and symbolic space 
outside the market.
This work of  rewriting urban history through choice and the way 
of  preserving traces constructed in the past is consistent not only with 
the reactivation of  the intra-urban land and property market, but 
also with the mutation of  values accompanying it. The restoration of  
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monuments is progressively replaced by an approach by quarter, which 
aims at unifying and harmonizing the image that should ideally be 
projected by these old central quarters, along with the clearly various 
uses that characterize them. Hence the city—a complex and plural 
space, a popular polarity, religious as well as craft and commercial—is 
the subject of  a conservation programme geared to transforming it into 
an outdoor museum. Consequently, the way of  receiving is limited and 
channelled through a strong trans-national, commercial and tourist-
style image of  the Muslim East with its gleaming mosques, suqs, and 
cafés. The ways of  living and working in the old city are not, of  
course, erased so easily, but the aging of  the resident population offers 
the chance of  an accelerated dismantlement of  areas of  craft activity 
not linked to tourism and helps ensure there will be feeble resistance 
to the folklorization of  landscapes and usages. Codifi cation according 
to trans-national norms does not just have a purely commercial func-
tion linked to international tourism; it is also a way of  domesticating a 
plural and popular Islam and of  making it consumable by everybody, 
while re-appropriating the use of  this lost centrality, still considered 
the basis of  the city rather than its heart. In addition to the probable 
disintegration of  urban ambiences linked to the mixing of  usages, 
turning the old centre into a museum under the name of  “Islamic 
city” or “Fatimid city” (even though the edifi ces of  this period have 
almost completely disappeared) is accompanied by increasingly fl ashy 
renovations of  palaces and mosques; the syndrome of  the funfair, which 
must be clean, smooth and shiny, often has the upper hand over respect 
for forms, material and the wear of  time. We are not far in terms of  
motivation, but this time too for internal ends, from the reconstruc-
tion of  the environment of  the other in one’s own image, timelessly, 
as the Street in Cairo might have been in the 1889 universal exhibition 
in Paris. This is still more the case when the plateau of  the Pyramids, 
in Giza, to the west of  Cairo, sees the architectural reconstitution, on 
virgin land, of  an eastern suq with its streets, squares, and of  course 
its shops—the Khan al-Azizi!
This summoning up and valorization of  the splendours of  the past 
is not limited to the old city and its monuments; it also affects the city 
inherited from the end of  the nineteenth century and the beginning of  
the twentieth. The activity of  patrimonialization now comes to affect 
noteworthy buildings, villas, apartment blocks, the Stock Market, banks, 
even architectural assemblages and city-centre squares, whose land 
began to be allotted at the end of  the nineteenth century but whose 
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building actually dates from the beginning of  the twentieth. Also affected 
are more recent concessions like Garden City and Heliopolis. Legal 
protection, classifi cation and renovations fl ourish, and they reiterate the 
high praises accorded to those traces of  an architecture imported for the 
promotion of  private cities. Let us simply cite the examples of  Mena 
Garden City and New Heliopolis. The whole entity is in harmony and 
implies the same investors, city-centre patrons and promoters of  the 
desert, with a view to elaborating a new referential era, a new Golden 
Age for Cairo, that of  the liberal age. Delegated to businessmen, the 
enterprise of  patrimonialization legitimizes these as a feature of  civil 
society. The renovation of  the Stock Exchange quarter, the restoration of  
façades and the implanting of  a pedestrian zone integrating the adjacent 
roads, carried out by an association of  businessmen, symbolizes this 
propagation of  image geared to highlighting private initiatives, at the 
risk of  underlining that the period of  national construction after 1952 
was more damaging than the preceding colonial infl uence. The revi-
sion of  history now extends to proposing a rehabilitation of  kingship, 
notably through the creation of  a museum dedicated to King Farouq 
in Helwan. Over and above the obvious function of  creating a value to 
accompany the liberalization of  the land necessary for the re-conquest 
of  the centre, along with the closely linked function of  glorifying liber-
alization even when it involves legitimizing a quasi-royal succession for 
contemporary Egypt, such renovations turned rehabilitation provide a 
historical base for the new forms of  living in the desert. The private 
cities no longer represent an illegitimate import; they rather provide a 
rebirth of  the glorious past of  the metropolis. The patrimonialization 
enterprises entailed in building at the beginning of  the century join 
forces with this procedure of  creating a patina, that is to say, of  creat-
ing a nostalgia through the re-appropriation of  social usages and of  an 
old building frame; in the context, in the case of  the private cities, of  a 
patrimonialization and historicization of  the present. The issue at stake 
with this patina is to promote, apart from authenticity, a nostalgia of  the 
present. As such, present-day life appears not simply historicized, but as 
something that has already been lost. Like fashion, which is a product 
of  the intertwining of  worlds and a feature of  accelerated circulation 
around the world, the patina generates what is ephemeral. This fab-
rication of  time, by placing the present in parenthesis for the ends of  
promotion and consumption, joins forces with the issue of  urban fears, 
in the sense that it creates instability. It calls upon a person to protect 
himself, to consume protection in the face of  increasing uncertainty, 
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of  the destabilization of  all daily routines, of  complexity and growing 
interdependence. It is a way of  fashioning a metropolis which, though 
it provides a reactivation of  the old forms of  agglomeration, gives no 
incitement to the questioning of  socio-spatial disparities—gives them, 
even, an inherited legitimacy.
Conclusion
Since the present exercise, the synthetic presentation of  a city, cannot 
be reduced to the prudent provision of  a sum of  observations, but must 
necessarily suggest a path to an attempted restitution of  a totality, with 
all its nuances, and also a reductive coherence, the presentation of  the 
Cairo metropolis proposed here is not free of  gaps. It aims, primarily, 
at shedding light on a contemporary trajectory by focusing fi rmly on 
demographic stabilization and its spatial consequences, specifi cally in 
terms of  expansion of  the metropolitan area and of  the selective redis-
tribution of  populations. An analysis of  the means of  production, and of  
the ways to articulate the urban forms that accompany them, follows. It 
further shows how a new order, both spatial and social, is incorporated 
within a relation renewed by economic liberalization, and how this 
harmonization entails a rewriting of  history and a re-appropriation of  
inherited forms. The reading of  landscapes under construction in the 
case of  private cities, and in the course of  being restructured through 
the legalization of  unregulated habitat, takes into account social distanc-
ing and the affi rmation of  a security-based, integrative approach—the 
integration being reduced to macro-economic goals.
At this point, we must face the potential conclusion that we have 
merely replaced the impression of  demographic explosion, currently 
prevalent in syntheses about Cairo, by the establishment of  a new 
socio-spatial tyranny that recomposes existing inequalities to the point 
of  caricature; to the extent that only a stringently security-based, 
authoritarian approach will be seen as capable of  still holding the 
totality together. As such, the danger of  an explosion would not have 
disappeared—it would simply have become transferred. The brutal 
and rapid nature of  these changes induces us to consider that there 
is, in practice, an accentuation of  fundamental divisions. By the same 
token, the overall perception of  the large cities of  the Arab-Muslim 
world suggests a stringent, unlimited police control of  social hazards 
and of  opposition.
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We have to make the same observation as those presentations 
which—concluding that an explosion is imminent, but never in fact 
meeting with the destroyed new Babylon—insist, as if  to justify the 
non-realization of  their prophecies: “yet it does move.” Without deny-
ing the tyranny of  fundamental social divisions and the risks of  social 
explosion bound up with the total absence of  legal representation and 
channels for political opposition, we are bound to recognize that the 
metropolis contains resources allowing the whole, which is necessarily 
interdependent, to function and create a system; that is to say, exchanges 
rendered peaceful do dominate daily practice.
It would now be fi tting (although this goes beyond our present pur-
pose) to study the modes of  reception and accommodation of  these new 
urban objects that, a priori, invite sorting and distancing. In a social 
science perspective—taking, that is, an approach centred on reception, 
interaction and usages and not merely on transient, textual and objective 
appearances—the transactions and hybridizations that form the mixing 
of  the landscapes should be accorded their proper weight. And what if  
the impenetrable, that is, the resistance of  the co-presence and mixing 
of  usages that enables this evident noisy incoherence (which remains the 
fi rst impression) to persist—what if  this was precisely what fashioned 
the metropolis, along with its capacity to transcend contradictions? 
The shopping mall, which may be regarded as one of  the categories 
of  privatization, is also a new public space, somewhat reminiscent of  
the suq. It permits new usages and a new mixing.18 The appropriation 
of  new centralities in a way that does not follow the wishes of  develop-
ers, when these extol, for instance, the setting up of  an open museum, 
is one such necessary approach. Studies of  the way popular quarters 
insert themselves within the metropolitan economy would be similarly 
benefi cial. The fl exibility of  relations and usages, and of  transaction, 
seems always to win the day. Likewise, mobility and transportation, 
which have not been discussed here, may certainly, in their recent 
development, bear witness to sorting and dualization, with a very clear 
bias towards fast roadways and consequently towards the accessibility 
to cars of  the new quarters of  prestige and business. However, the very 
marked fl exibility of  the transportation supply is also favourable to the 
intensifi cation of  links. It reinforces proximity, despite the extension of  
the metropolis. Similarly, the metro tends to transcend deep divisions 
18 See Abaza, “Shopping Malls.”
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and favour co-presence. It also induces responsible refl exes, to the extent 
that service is guaranteed and of  quality.
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